The Abuse Sharing Economy
Citation
Kurt Thomas et al. βThe Abuse Sharing Economy: Understanding the Limits of Threat Exchanges.β RAID, 2016. Google Research. Accessed 2026-08-14.
Source type: measurement research
Evidence quality: primary
Review status: checked
What it says
Using 45 million IP addresses observed abusing six Google services during a two-week 2015 snapshot, the authors studied infrastructure reuse across spam, fake-account registration, malicious hosting, and other abuse. Cross-service intelligence could identify some abusive traffic, but outright IP blacklisting produced an untenable false-positive volume.
Important claims
- Adversaries reuse infrastructure across abuse types.
- Each service observes a biased slice of the same ecosystem.
- A predictive signal can be useful for added evidence while being unsafe as a direct ban rule.
Assumptions and weaknesses
The observation window was short, limited to Google services, and IP meaning has continued to change with mobile networks, cloud services, proxies, and shared infrastructure.
Implications for platform defense
Separate signal usefulness from enforcement sufficiency. Cross-context reputation can raise risk without establishing that a particular user or action is abusive.
Chapters this affects
Chapters 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 15.